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FTA Dispute Settlement Mechanisms – Alternative Fora for Trade Disputes: The Case 
of CETA and EUJEPA* 
Furculita Cornelia** 
Abstract: This paper investigates whether in the context of the Appellate Body crisis and the 
more developed FTA norms, the dispute settlement mechanisms contained in EU FTAs, 
particularly CETA and EUJEPA, could emerge as attractive alternative fora for solving trade 
disputes. The paper will analyze potential substantive and procedural aspects that would shape the 
answer to the posed question. It will argue that CETA and EUJEPA dispute settlement mechanisms 
could become partial attractive bilateral alternatives to solve trade disputes between the parties. 
However, it will also show that there are certain aspects that will act against these mechanisms. 
Keywords: WTO, new generation EU FTAs, Appellate Body Crisis, Dispute Settlement, 
Trade. 
1. Introduction 
Most free trade agreements (‘FTAs’) contain rules on interstate dispute settlement,1 however 
in practice states have rarely availed themselves of these Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
(‘DSMs’).2 The WTO DSM, on the other hand, was referred to as the ‘crown jewel of the WTO 
System’, because of its often usage by the Member States and productive activity.3 The WTO 
DSM is, however, currently undergoing an unprecedented crisis. Since August 2017 the US 
Administration is blocking any re-appointment and appointment of the Members of the Appellate 
Body (‘AB’), a standing body of seven persons that hears appeals from panel reports in WTO 
disputes. Since December 2019, when the terms of two other Members expired, the AB has only 
one Member and is dysfunctional, as it requires a minimum of three Members to hear appeals.  
 
* Draft version of the Chapter ‘FTA Dispute Settlement Mechanisms – Alternative Fora for Trade Disputes: The 
Case of CETA and EUJEPA’ in Wolfgang Weiss, Cornelia Furculita (eds.) Global Politics and EU Trade Policy: 
Facing the Challenges to a Multilateral Approach (Springer 2020). 
** PhD in Law, Marie Curie Early Stage Researcher, German University of Administrative Sciences Speyer. E-
mail: furculita@uni-speyer.de 
1 More than 97% of PTAs signed in the 2000s contain means of dispute settlement. (Todd Allee, Manfred Elsig, 
‘Dispute Settlement Provisions in PTAs: New Data and New Concepts’ in Andreas Dür, Manfred Elsig (eds), Trade 
Cooperation: The Purpose, Design and Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements (Cambridge University Press 
2015) p. 319, 324. 
2 For a list of disputes initiated under regional trade agreements see the website of Porges Trade Law 
<www.porgeslaw.com/rta-disputes/> accessed 24 July 2019 
3 Tetyana Payosova, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, ‘The Dispute Settlement Crisis in the World Trade 
Organization: Causes and Cures’ (2018) 18-5 PIIE Policy Brief p. 1, 1 
<https://piie.com/system/files/documents/pb18-5.pdf> accessed 24 July 2019 
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In the context of the AB crisis, it is expected that a rise in the use of the FTA DSMs will be 
noted soon. After consultations with Ukraine, the EU has already requested the establishment of a 
panel under their trade agreement in a dispute on a wood export ban that it claims to be in violation 
of an FTA norm equivalent to Art. XI:1 GATT.4 Moreover, even in case of a fully functioning 
WTO DSM, with the ongoing WTO negotiations stalemate, the FTAs are the centre of 
development of new trade rules, potentially enforceable only through FTA DSMs. Anticipating 
that the FTA DSMs use and importance will increase, it seems the right time to turn the attention 
towards them. This paper will investigate whether FTA DSMs could emerge as attractive 
alternative fora for solving trade disputes, using the case of CETA5 and EUJEPA6. CETA and 
EUJEPA were chosen as case studies, since they are representative for the most recent approaches 
taken by the EU in its trade agreements with respect to interstate dispute settlement. Moreover, all 
three trading partners: the EU, Canada, and Japan are top active users of the WTO DSM7 and they 
also adjudicated numerous disputes between them under the WTO rules.8 Thus, they often litigate 
their disputes in an international setting, have vast experience in this respect and would, probably, 
search for new venues to enforce their rights. This paper anticipates that they could find such new 
venues in CETA and EUJEPA for the settlement of disputes with FTA parties.9 
The paper first introduces CETA and EUJEPA DSMs focusing on their similarities with the 
WTO one. It then looks into their substantive coverage and its influence on shaping these 
mechanisms as alternative fora for trade dispute settlement. Finally, it performs a comparative 
analysis of procedural aspects of CETA, EUJEPA and WTO DSMs and assesses the implications 
of the differences. It concludes by evaluating the likelihood that the first two will be perceived as 
 
4 European Commission, ‘EU Asks for a Panel with Ukraine on Wood Export Ban’ (21 June 2019) 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2034> accessed 24 July 2019.  
5 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (‘CETA’) between Canada, of the one part, and the European 
Union and its Member States, of the other part [2017] OJ L11/23 
6 Agreement between the European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership (‘EUJEPA’) [2018] OJ L330/3  
7 Based on the available data till 2017, the EU was the second most active user of the WTO DSM, Canada – the 
third, and Japan – the eighth. (Arie Reich, ‘The Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement System: A Statistical 
Analysis’ (2017) 11 EUI Working Papers p. 1, 5) 
8 As of January 2020, Canada was a complainant against the EU in nine disputes and a respondent in six, while 
Japan was a complainant in one and a respondent in six. ‘WTO, Map of Disputes between WTO Members’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_maps_e.htm?country_selected=EEC&sense=e> accessed 24 
January 2020  
9 This could happen while also making efforts to find alternatives within the WTO, as for example, by using appeal 
arbitration proceedings under Art. 25 of the Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (‘DSU’), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2, 15 April 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994).  
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attractive alternatives to the WTO DSM. While strictly political considerations could also play a 
major role, they are outside the scope of this paper that performs a legal analysis of the substantive 
coverage and procedural aspects of CETA and EUJEPA DSMs.  
 
2. Introducing CETA and EUJEPA DSMs 
As in the case of most FTAs that use third-party adjudication,10 CETA and EUJEPA DSMs 
are inspired by WTO rules.  
The first stage of the WTO, CETA and EUJEPA DSMs consists of consultations during which 
parties should attempt to solve their dispute.11 A mutually agreed solution by the parties is to be 
preferred during all stages.12 If consultations fail, the complainant may request the establishment 
of a panel composed of three arbitrators13 that will review the facts of the dispute and will make 
determinations with respect to the compliance of the contested measure with the obligations 
prescribed by the respective Agreement. After issuing an interim report on which parties can 
comment and request a review, the panels issue their final reports containing the descriptive parts 
of facts and law, as well as, the findings and recommendations of the panel.14 The final panel 
rulings shall be binding on the parties.15 In contrast to CETA and EUJEPA, the WTO DSM 
provides with a possible next stage – that of appeal.16  
Under the WTO rules, CETA and EUJEPA when the final reports of the panels or Appellate 
Body (if there is an appeal stage in a WTO dispute) establish that a measure is inconsistent with 
the agreements, the implementation stage follows, during which the respondent shall bring that 
measure into conformity.17 Prompt compliance is preferred.18 If that is not possible, compliance 
should take place within a reasonable period of time (’RPT’) notified by the respondent or 
established through means of arbitration in case the complainant disagrees with it.19 If the 
 
10 Claude Chase and others, ‘Mapping of Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Regional Trade Agreements – 
Innovative or Variations on a Theme?’ in Rohini Acharya (ed), Regional Trade Agreements and Multilateral 
Trading System (Cambridge University Press 2016) p. 608, 610 
11 DSU, Art. 4; CETA, Art. 29.4; EUJEPA, Art. 21.5 
12 DSU, Art. 3.7; CETA, Art. 29.19; EUJEPA, Art. 21.26 
13 DSU, Art. 6, 8 (‘[U]nless the parties to the dispute agree […] to a panel composed of five panelists.’); CETA, Art. 
29.6; EUJEPA, Art. 21.7 
14 DSU, Art. 15; CETA, Art. 29.9-29.10; EUJEPA, Art. 21.18-21.19 
15 CETA, Art. 29.10; EUJEPA, Art. 21.15(8) 
16 DSU, Art. 17 
17 DSU, Art. 21; CETA, Art. 29.12-29.15; EUJEPA, Art. 21.20-21.23 
18 DSU, Art. 21.1; CETA, Art. 29.13(1); EUJEPA, Art. 21.20(1) 
19 DSU, Art. 21.3; CETA, Art. 29.13(2); EUJEPA, Art. 21.20(2) 
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responding party fails to notify any measure taken to comply or the measure taken is still not 
complying with the final report, the original complainant is entitled to receive compensation or to 
temporary suspend obligations (to impose ‘retaliatory measures’).20 The level of suspension of 
obligations can be contested by the respondent and decided through arbitration procedures.21 The 
respondent should take measures to comply with the report, as a result of which the suspension of 
obligations or compensation should be terminated.  
Thus, the stages of the DSMs contained in WTO, CETA, and EUJEPA are quite similar, 
however, there are also several important differences. 
 
3. Substantive Coverage Shaping CETA and EUJEPA DSMs as Alternative Fora for 
Trade Disputes 
3.1 The Substantive Coverage of the WTO, CETA and EUJEPA DSMs 
Both CETA and EUJEPA cover trade related issues that are also regulated by the WTO 
agreements. They contain chapters on national treatment (‘NT’) and market access for goods, 
technical barriers to trade (‘TBT’), sanitary and phytosanitary measures (‘SPS’), trade remedies, 
customs and trade facilitation, subsidies, state trading enterprises (‘STEs’), trade in services, public 
procurement, intellectual property, and transparency. They also cover a wide range of ‘issues lying 
outside the current WTO mandate’, the so-called WTO-x norms,22 such as: competition, 
environment, labor, regulatory cooperation, capital movement, small and medium enterprises 
(‘SMEs’), etc. However, what matters for the purpose of this paper is whether these FTA norms 
are enforceable and whether the substantive coverage of CETA and EUJEPA DSMs is comparable 
to the one of the WTO DSM.  
Both CETA and EUJEPA establish that unless otherwise provided in the agreement, the 
dispute settlement chapters apply to ‘any dispute between the Parties concerning the interpretation 
and application of the provisions of this Agreement’.23 Therefore, only FTA norms can be enforced 
through these DSMs. The possibility to enforce norms outside FTAs through the bilateral dispute 
 
20 DSU, Art. 21.5-22; CETA, Art. 29.14; EUJEPA, Art. 21.21-21.22 
21 DSU, Art. 21.6; CETA, Art. 29.14(5)-(6); EUJEPA, Art. 21.22(6) 
22 Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis, André Sapir, Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential Trade 
Agreements (Bruegel Blueprint Series 2009) p. 1, 4 
23 CETA, Art. 29.2; EUJEPA, Art. 21.2 
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settlement proceedings, such as WTO norms that are not reproduced or referenced, is excluded.24 
Therefore, CETA and EUJEPA DSMs could become alternatives to the WTO DSM only with 
respect to FTA norms that regulate the same areas as the WTO does and are covered by the DSM 
chapters.  
Even if CETA and EUJEPA DSMs cover a wide range of issues, they also exclude recourse to 
inter-state dispute settlement for certain subject matters. They both exclude the following areas 
from their dispute settlement chapters: trade remedies (anti-dumping and countervailing measures, 
global safeguards),25 labor and environment commitments26 and competition.27 CETA additionally 
carves-out subsidies28 and decisions under the Investment Canada Act,29 while EUJEPA does so 
with respect to: certain provisions related to SPS measures,30 disputes concerning exclusively TBT 
incorporated provisions,31 specific subsidies that are not expressly prohibited,32 cooperation on 
intellectual property,33 corporate governance,34 good regulatory practices and regulatory 
cooperation,35 cooperation in agriculture,36 and SMEs.37 The areas excluded from the coverage of 
the analyzed EU FTAs DSMs concern almost all WTO-x areas (except capital movement) with 
respect to which FTAs are the only forum for enforcement, but also certain areas regulated by the 
WTO agreements. It is, therefore, clear that CETA and EUJEPA cannot become alternatives to the 
WTO DSM in respect to them. Hence, an important part of potential disputes will be possible to 
be brought only to the WTO forum. Disputes on trade remedies and prohibited subsidies, as well 
as, those on some specific TBT and SPS provisions seem to be left exclusively for the WTO DSM.  
 
24 Stephan W Schill, ‘Authority, Legitimacy, and Fragmentation in the (Envisaged) Dispute Settlement Disciplines 
in Mega-Regionals’ in Stefan Griller, Walter Obwexer, Erich Vranes (eds) Mega-Regional Trade Agreements: 
CETA, TTIP, and TiSA: New Orientations for EU External Economic Relations (Oxford University Press 2017) p. 
111, 123 
25 CETA, Art. 3.7; EUJEPA, Art. 5.9(2), 5.11(2) 
26 CETA, Art. 23.11, 24.16; EUJEPA, Art. 16.17 
27 CETA, Art. 17.4; EUJEPA, Art. 11.9 
28 CETA, Art. 7.9 
29 CETA, Annex 8-C 
30 EUJEPA, Art. 6.16(1); These EUJEPA provisions concern the risk assessment according to Art. 5 SPS Agreement 
(Art. 6.6), the arbitrariness or unjustifiability of import procedures (Art. 6.7(4)(b)), publication and communication 
of processing period of import procedures (Art. 6.7(4)(c)), information requirements for import procedures (Art. 
6.7(4)(d)) and equivalence of SPS measures (Art. 6.14) 
31 EUJEPA, Art. 7.3(3) 
32 EUJEPA, Art. 12.10 
33 EUJEPA, Art. 14.52 
34 EUJEPA, Art. 15.7 
35 EUJEPA, Art. 18.19 
36 EUJEPA, Art. 19.8 
37 EUJEPA, Art. 20.4 
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Still, there are many other areas left for the jurisdiction of CETA and EUJEPA: tariff 
regulations, the remaining SPS, TBT and subsidies provisions, STEs, customs valuation, services, 
intellectual property rules not related to cooperation, and public procurement. Consequently, when 
a dispute arises in respect to these areas, CETA and EUJEPA DSMs could be potential alternatives 
to the WTO DSMs.  
3.2 The Influence of the Competition between Substantive FTAs and WTO Norms 
When it comes to areas that are covered by the WTO, CETA, and EUJEPA DSMs, the choice 
in favor of a forum would be influenced by the competition between substantive WTO and FTAs 
norms.  
The FTAs contain norms that incorporate or reproduce WTO norms – so-called ‘WTO equal’ 
norms. The use of FTA DSMs for disputes on these norms will be mainly affected by other 
considerations than substantive ones, such as procedural considerations, because the substantive 
norms governing the dispute will have similar contents. ‘WTO-plus’ norms, on the other hand, are 
FTA norms ‘which come under the current mandate of the WTO, where the parties undertake 
bilateral commitments going beyond those they have accepted at the multilateral level’.38 Thus, if 
a dispute concerns a violation of WTO-plus norms, the FTA parties would have to initiate 
proceedings in FTAs fora, in order to enforce the WTO-plus norms contained in the FTAs rather 
than the corresponding WTO norms. In these cases, FTA DSMs will emerge not as alternatives, 
but as the only available fora, as the WTO DSM does not cover them. Even though the issue 
whether non-WTO law can be applied or otherwise be relevant in WTO disputes remains unsettled, 
it is generally agreed that the WTO panels and AB have no jurisdiction to rule that a non-WTO 
norm, such as an FTA one, has been violated.39 Art. 1.1 of the DSU clearly provides that it shall 
apply only to disputes brought pursuant to consultations and dispute settlement provisions of the 
covered agreements. Thus, even though the question whether FTA norms could serve as 
justifications or defenses for a WTO breach remains open, the WTO panels and AB clearly cannot 
enforce FTA norms. Yet, there could be measures that would be simultaneously violating WTO 
and WTO-plus or WTO-x norms or the WTO-plus and WTO-x norm would be violated along 
other WTO norms. In such cases, CETA and EUJEPA would not only be offering potential 
 
38 Horn, Mavroidis, Sapir supra note 22 p. 4 
39 See Lorand Bartels, ‘Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings’ (2001) 35(3) Journal of World 
Trade p. 499, 502-503; Joost Pauwelyn, ‘How to Win a World Trade Organization Dispute Based on Non-World 
Trade Organization Law? Questions of Jurisdiction and Merits’ (2003) 37(6) Journal of World Trade p. 997, 1000 
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alternative DSMs to hear claims on the same measures, but also DSMs which would apply more 
favorable norms from the complainant’s perspective. The usage of CETA and EUJEPA DSMs, 
even in these cases, would still be contingent upon procedural aspects, as states could perceive 
these mechanisms as not offering the necessary features in order to be used for the settlement of 
their disputes. 
4. Procedural Aspects 
Even though WTO, CETA and EUJEPA DSMs are similarly designed, they are still different. 
Besides being necessary to answer the question posed by the present paper, this section is also 
relevant for the general functioning of these DSMs with respect to all areas and disputes, including 
those on WTO-x and WTO-plus with respect to which the FTA DSMs are the only available fora 
for enforcement. 
4.1 Absence of Co-complainants and Third-Parties in CETA and EUJEPA Proceedings 
Important differences in proceedings stem from the fact that WTO is a multilateral organization, 
while CETA and EUJEPA are bilateral agreements. 
WTO DSM allows other WTO Members to join a dispute as co-complaints by filing parallel 
claims within the same dispute,40 or as third-parties without directly confronting the respondent 
but expressing their interest and position in the dispute.41 Thus, Members can form a common 
front and exercise pressure together in a dispute. Additionally, by using the multilateral 
proceedings, parties could establish a de facto precedent to be used in future disputes. 
Nevertheless, while ‘absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal 
question in the same way in a subsequent case’,42 the final report would still have binding force 
only for the dispute between the parties.43 It could also be in the interest of the defendant to 
adjudicate the dispute at the multilateral level where it can act simultaneously against multiple 
complainants, avoiding the need of going through a series of proceedings under the rules of 
 
40 DSU, Art. 9(2) 
41 DSU, Art. 10.2 
42 Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, 
WT/DS344/AB/R, 30 April 2008, [160] 
43 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO/DS8/AB/R, 4 October 1996, 14 
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different FTAs.44 CETA and EUJEPA, however, offer proceedings in which only FTA parties can 
participate.  
Having to adjudicate the same measure in different fora, going through multiple proceedings, 
and not having the possibility to put the same pressure, could be a significant disadvantage of 
bilateral DSMs. Therefore, CETA and EUJEPA DSMs cannot become full alternatives to the WTO 
DSM, but only with respect to bilateral dispute settlement. 
4.2 Timeframes under CETA and EUJEPA DSMs 
The expected length of the proceedings could be a determining factor when deciding to use a 
DSM. The expeditiousness of proceedings becomes especially critical when the nullification or 
impairment of the benefits increase very fast as time passes, as in the case of perishable goods.45  
The WTO dispute settlement proceedings generally last longer than the FTAs ones. From 
consultations to the issuing of panel report it should take up to fifteen months and if there is an 
appeal – eighteen months. The issue in case of the WTO proceedings, however, is not the 
timeframes as set in the DSU, but the fact that they are not respected. The WTO disputes now take 
more than the double of the DSU’s envisaged eighteen months for procedures with an appeal 
stage.46 One of the main criticisms brought by the US administration in the context of the AB crisis 
is that the appellate stage regularly takes longer than the prescribed period of ninety days.47  
The proceedings under CETA and EUJEPA, from consultations till the issuance of the panel 
report should take about eight months and, respectively – nine months.48 Thus, the timeframes 
established for the EU FTAs under analysis should be almost twice shorter than the ones described 
under the DSU that in practice last even longer. It is, nevertheless, hard to say what would be the 
actual duration of the procedures under CETA and EUJEPA DSMs, as they were never applied in 
practice and the deadlines were not tested in actual cases.49 Moreover, the procedures within WTO 
 
44 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Going Global, Regional, or Both? Dispute Settlement in the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) and Overlaps with the WTO and Other Jurisdictions’ (2004) 13 Minnesota Journal of Global 
Trade Minnesota Journal of Global Trade p. 231, 250 
45 Fernando Pierola, Gary Horlick, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and Dispute Settlement in the “North-South” 
Agreements of the Americas: Considerations for Choice of Forum’ (2007) 41(5) Journal of World Trade p. 885, 895 
46 Amy Porges, ‘Designing Common but Differentiated Rules for Regional Trade Disputes’ [2018] ICTSD RTA 
Exchange Issue Paper p. 1, 6  
47 DSU, Art. 17.5 
48 Calculated by summing up the terms prescribed by CETA, Art. 29.6(1), 29.7(2)-(4). 29.9-29.10 and EUJEPA, Art. 
21.5, 21.8(2)-(3), 21.18-21.19 
49 Chase and others supra note 10 p. 610; Céline Todeschini-Marthe, ‘Dispute Settlement Mechanisms Under Free 
Trade Agreements and the WTO: Stakes, Issues and Practical Considerations: A Question of Choice?’ (2018) 13(9) 
Global Trade and Customs Journal p. 387, 402  
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take also longer because of the presence of an appeal stage. Even though this stage adds to the 
length of the proceedings, it is linked to some advantages.50 The lengthier procedures within WTO 
are also associated with good quality, as a good report requires more time.51  
The shorter envisaged timeframes of the proceedings under CETA and EUJEPA could be an 
attractive characteristic. If the complainant is looking for speedier procedures and this is an 
essential aspect, then the DSMs under CETA and EUJEPA could be an appealing alternative to 
the WTO DSM, provided the timeframes are actually respected. If, however, FTA parties would 
be looking for a system that provides with the advantages associated with an appeal stage, despite 
the shorter deadlines, they could consider CETA and EUJEPA DSMs as not being attractive 
alternatives. 
4.3 The Panel Selection Process  
Not only the timeframes of the procedures under the WTO, CETA and EUJEPA DSMs are 
different, but also the selection processes of the panels. The way the panels are selected could 
ensure that the procedures would not be delayed or blocked by one party, impairing the access to 
dispute settlement procedures enshrined in the treaties.   
At the WTO level, the nominations for the panels are made by the WTO Secretariat52 that 
maintains a list of indicative names from which it may draw candidates53 or it can consider other 
names.54 The proposed nominations by the secretariat shall not be opposed by the parties to the 
dispute except for ‘compelling reasons’.55 If, however, parties are opposing and cannot agree on 
the composition of the panel within twenty days from the establishment of the panel, at the request 
of any party, the Director-General, consulting the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body 
(‘DSB’)56 and the Chairman of the relevant Council or Committee, appoints the panelists 
considered most appropriate.57 Therefore, the DSU provides a quasi-automatic selection process 
 
50 See infra Section 4.4 The Absence of an Appeal Stage under CETA and EUJEPA DSMs 
51 Pauwelyn, supra note 44 p. 258 
52 DSU, Art. 8.6 
53 DSU, Art. 8.4 
54 WTO Secretariat, ‘The Stages in a Typical WTO Dispute’ in A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
(2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2017) p. 49, 72 
55 DSU, Art. 8.6 
56 The procedures under the DSU are administered by the Dispute Settlement Body (‘DSB’) – a political body, 
composed of representatives of all the Members. According to Art. IV:3, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994): ‘The General Council shall 
convene as appropriate to discharge the responsibilities of the Dispute Settlement Body provided for in the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding.’ 
57 DSU, Art. 8.7 
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that ensures that a responding party will not be able to block or delay the entire procedures. The 
AB is a standing body, therefore there is no risk that a party will block its composition for a 
specific dispute. However, this system is prone to a different kind of problem, that of the 
appointment and reappointment of AB Members – a problem that can be currently noted and that 
provides the relevant context for the current analysis. 
Similar to WTO panels, the panels in CETA and EUJEPA are composed on an ad-hoc basis, 
but there is no similar authority to the WTO Secretariat to nominate the panelists. Parties should, 
first, attempt to reach an agreement on the panel composition within ten days.58 Under both 
agreements the Joint Committees (‘JCs’) at their first meetings should establish a list of 
individuals (at least fifteen for CETA, and at least nine for EUJEPA) to serve as arbitrators 
composed of three sub-lists: two for each party and one for individuals to serve as chairpersons 
that are non-nationals of either party.59 The JCs under CETA and EUJEPA are co-chaired by 
representatives of each party responsible for trade at the highest level, or their respective 
delegates.60  
In case parties cannot reach an agreement on the panel composition, both CETA and EUJEPA 
DSMs provide further rules. In CETA either party can request the Chair of the JC or his delegate 
to draw the three arbitrators by lot from the respective sub-lists of arbitrators, as soon as possible 
and normally within five days. The success of the selection by lot procedures also hinges upon 
who is the authority that performs it. Where the respondent can claim the power for this selection, 
this default mechanism could be seriously weakened.61 Since in CETA, the Chair is held by 
representatives of both parties, it establishes that in case one of the co-chairs did not accept to 
participate within five days of the request to select the arbitrators, one of the chairpersons can 
perform the selection by lot alone.62 The question arises what does ‘not accept to participate’ 
means, is there a need of a formal acknowledgment or mere silence would suffice.63 Since the 
agreement prescribes the term of five working days, mere silence seems to be enough to proceed 
 
58 CETA, Art. 29.7(2); EUJEPA, Art. 21.8(2) 
59 CETA, Art. 29.8; EUJEPA, Art. 21.9 
60 CETA, Art. 26.1(1); EUJEPA, Art. 22.1(3) 
61 Chase and others supra note 10 645 
62 CETA, Art. 29.7(4) 
63 Simon Lester, Inu Manak, Andrej Arpas, ‘Access to Trade Justice: Fixing NAFTA’s Flawed State-to-State 
Dispute Settlement Process’ (2019) 18(1) World Trade Review p. 63, 74 
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to the selection by lot done by only one of them. Therefore, the co-chair from the respondent will 
not cause undesirable delays to the process of selection by lot of arbitrators.  
EUJEPA, on the other hand, provides that if there is no agreement, each party shall select 
within five days one arbitrator from their own sub-lists that will not act as chairpersons. If they 
fail to do so, the co-chair of the JC from the complaining party will select an arbitrator from the 
sub-list of the party that failed to appoint an arbitrator in another five days. If the parties fail to 
agree on the chairperson, within five days the co-chair from the complainant will select the 
chairperson by lot from the sub-list of chairpersons.64 Since the authority selecting by lot in 
EUJEPA is the co-chair of the JC from the complainant, this ensures that the selection will not be 
under threat of delays caused by the respondent.65  
The procedures described above are the ones followed in case there is a list from which names 
can be drawn by lot. However, it is well possible that the parties will not be able to agree on the 
lists or that the lists would be incomplete.66 NAFTA represents an example of an FTA in which 
without a roster of panelists, the responding party can object any proposed arbitrator and block 
the entire procedures.67 CETA provides that if there is no list or if it does not contain sufficient 
names, the arbitrators should be drawn by lot from the arbitrators that were proposed by one or 
both parties.68 As long as the complainant has proposed its own arbitrators and they are still 
available, the composition of the panel is theoretically ensured. It is, nonetheless, not clear from 
which sub-list the nominated arbitrators and chairpersons should be selected, who shall perform 
the selection and within which deadline. Because of the provisions’ ambiguity the panel selection 
could be significantly delayed. It also does not give preference to the arbitrators proposed by both 
parties over those proposed by only one party. Thus, a panel could be composed only of arbitrators 
proposed by a single party, even though there were candidates proposed by both of them, which 
would raise concerns about the impartiality of the panel.  
EUJEPA provides with a more sophisticated mechanism for panel selection in case the lists 
are not established or contain less names than required. If the chairpersons sub-list has: (i) two 
individuals agreed by the parties - the co-chair of the JC from the complainant shall select by lot 
 
64 EUJEPA, Art. 21.8(3)-(4) 
65 Lester, Manak, Arpas supra note 63 p. 75 
66 As of January 2020, there are no published lists of arbitrators established under CETA and EUJEPA rules. 
67 David A. Gantz, ‘The United States and NAFTA Dispute Settlement: Ambivalence, Frustration and Occasional 
Defiance’ (2009) 06-16 Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper p. 356, 387 
68 CETA, Art. 29.7(6) 
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within five days a chairperson from them; (ii) one individual agreed - that individual shall act as 
chairperson; (iii) no individual agreed – the co-chair of the JC from the complainant shall select 
by lot within five days from individuals that were proposed by one party at the time of 
establishing.69 The selection of other arbitrators follows a similar procedure with the difference 
that in case there are at least two or one individuals agreed on the arbitrators sub-lists, the parties 
are first allowed to choose within five days from these names and if they do not choose, the 
procedures as described for the selection by lot of chairpersons applies mutatis mutandis.70 Thus, 
EUJEPA provides with clear steps to be followed for the particular cases in which the sub-list for 
chairpersons and then for other arbitrators are not established avoiding potential confusion with 
respect to which sub-list should be used in the process. Additionally, it clearly establishes the 
authority performing the potential selections by lot and the deadlines for the procedures and 
always gives preference to the names agreed by both parties. If there are no names agreed by both 
parties, the panel could be formed by arbitrators proposed only by one party. Yet, this would only 
happen, if the other party assumed this risk by not proposing its own candidates. Furthermore, 
EUJEPA provides an extra guarantee – if an individual formally proposed is no longer available, 
a new individual can be proposed.71  
CETA and EUJEPA DSMs arrange for the panels to be composed even if parties do not reach 
an agreement and if there are no lists of arbitrators. Therefore, a complainant looking at CETA 
and EUJEPA DSMs as possible alternatives to the WTO DSM, should not be worried that the 
procedures will not pass the stage of panel composition, as it happened in NAFTA. Nevertheless, 
the panel selection procedures under CETA could raise some concerns regarding the arbitrators’ 
independence. Furthermore, if the arbitrators’ list is not established under this agreement, the 
panel composition could be considerably delayed, this being a possible reason for reluctance 
against the use of CETA DSM. 
4.4 The Absence of an Appeal Stage under CETA and EUJEPA DSMs 
WTO proceedings offer the possibility to have an appellate stage during which the AB hears 
the appeals of panel reports (yet, since December 2019, due to the insufficient number of AB 
Members, divisions to hear appeals cannot be established, but parties could make use of interim 
 
69 EUJEPA, Art. 21.8(5)(a) 
70 EUJEPA, Art. 21.8(5)(b) 
71 EUJEPA, Art. 21.8(5)(a)(iii) 
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appeal arbitration arrangements signed under Art. 25 of the DSU to replicate the appeal procedures 
as close as possible). Neither CETA, nor EUJEPA provide with a second stage during which 
appeals of panel reports could be heard. 
There are certain advantages that are associated with the presence of an appeal stage. It offers 
the opportunity to correct potential mistakes from panel reports.72 Furthermore, knowing that the 
reports will be under the AB’s scrutiny, incentivizes the panels to issue better quality reports that 
are drafted more carefully.73 The proceedings that go through an appellate review also ensure more 
coherence in the rendered decisions. The AB usually follows its own case law, this bringing more 
certainty, predictability, and stability to the system.74  
There are also drawbacks that states could see in the presence of an appellate stage. Besides 
the lengthier proceedings caused by the appeal, more coherence means less control. States that 
want to retain more control over dispute settlement, might be reticent to choose a system that, 
sometimes against their will, develops its own jurisprudence and follows it.75 Ad-hoc panels not 
subject to an appeal conducted by a standing body, are less prone to developing a consistent 
jurisprudence that does not have the support of the parties. The US criticizes the AB for its acquired 
independence and allegedly going beyond its mandate by inter alia offering overreaching 
interpretations, making obiter dicta, de novo reviews and establishing precedents.76  
In the context of some concerns about particular AB approaches, the more controllable FTA 
DSMs without an appellate stage might seem more appealing for some states and a desirable 
alternative to the WTO DSM. While others – concerned about the certainty, predictability, and the 
quality of reports, could perceive CETA and EUJEPA DSMs as not offering the same level of 
guarantees to become actual alternatives. 
4.5 Administrative and Legal Support provided by Secretariats 
 
72 Jennifer Hillman, ‘Dispute Settlement Mechanism’ in Jeffrey J. Schott, Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs (eds) ‘Assessing 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership’ vol 2 (2016) 16-4 PIIE Briefing p. 101, 102; Todeschini-Marthe supra note 49 p. 401 
73 Pauwelyn, supra note 44 p. 260 
74 Pierola, Horlick supra note 45 p. 899 
75 Schill supra note 24 p. 119 
76 WTO, DSB Meeting, ‘Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
Geneva’, 27 August 2018 <https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/290/Aug27.DSB_.Stmt_.as-
delivered.fin_.public.pdf> accessed 24 July 2019; Office of the United States Trade Representative, The President’s 
2018 Trade Policy Agenda p. 1, 22-28 
<https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2018/AR/2018%20Annual%20Report%20I.pdf> accessed 24 
July 2019 
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Another important factor that could be decisive for the potential rise of FTA DSMs as attractive 
alternatives to the WTO DSM is the presence or absence of administrative and legal support 
provided by secretariats to the adjudicating bodies. 
Both WTO panels and the AB benefit from the support of secretariats. The WTO Secretariat 
has the responsibility to assist panels on legal, historical, and procedural aspects, as well as to 
provide secretarial and technical support.77 The AB benefits from the administrative and legal 
support offered by the AB Secretariat.78 Secretariats offer administrative support with technical 
and secretarial work, such as: document exchanging and management, roster coordination, 
translation and interpretation services, information services, and capacity building.79 Panelists are 
part-timers appointed to deal with single disputes. They might not have the time, knowledge or 
capacity to engage in all the details of the case,80 while the AB has to deal with multiple complex 
cases under the strain of short deadlines. These Secretariats are comprised of well-experienced 
staff that can also provide with legal support that entails research and drafting assistance to ensure 
that the legal and factual arguments are adequately developed and that high quality reports are 
issued in a timely manner.81 They also ensure that cases are solved in a consistent and predictable 
manner across time.82 Too much consistency could, however, make states reluctant to entrust the 
secretariats with extensive authority, as they could develop and promote the perpetuation of 
jurisprudence of ad-hoc panels without having the support of the parties. Moreover, having 
secretariats involves high financial expenditures,83 hence it might not seem worth investing in 
secretariats for DSMs that only seldom deal with cases. 
The DSM established by CETA does not stipulate that panels can benefit from any kind of 
support offered by an entity similar to the WTO and AB Secretariats. The parties could attribute 
to the absence of secretariats a significant importance and be more hesitant about seeing CETA 
 
77 DSU, Art. 27.1  
78 DSU, Art. 17.7 
79 Amelia Porges, ‘Dispute Settlement’ in Jean-Pierre Chauffor, Jean – Christophe Maur (eds) Preferential Trade 
Agreement Policies for Development: A Handbook (World Bank 2011) p. 467, 479 
80 James Flett, ‘Referring PTA Disputes to the WTO Dispute Settlement System’ in Andreas Dür, Manfred Elsig, 
Trade Cooperation: The Purpose, Design and Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements (Cambridge University 
Press 2015) p. 555, 558 
81 William J. Davey, ‘Dispute Settlement in the WTO and RTAs: A Comment’ in Lorand Bartels, Federico Ortino 
(eds) Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford University Press 2006) p. 343, 354; Pierola, 
Horlick supra note 45 p. 898; Todeschini-Marthe supra note 49 p. 402 
82 Davey supra note 81 p. 355; Robert McDougall, ‘Regional Trade Agreement Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: 
Modes, Challenges and Options for Effective Dispute Resolution’ [2018] RTA Exchange Issue Paper p. 1, 9 
83 Chase and others supra note 10 p. 676 
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DSM as a real alternative to the WTO dispute settlement. The absence of the legal support, 
nonetheless, could be a positive aspect, if the parties are bothered by the considerable authority 
that a secretariat could gain. 
EUJEPA, on the other hand, has a very innovative norm. It provides that ‘the Parties may agree 
to jointly entrust an external body with providing support for certain administrative tasks for the 
dispute settlement procedure.’84 This norm entitles parties to agree to outsource the administration 
of the disputes to already established bodies. This would make possible to benefit from part of the 
advantages that secretariats entail and avoid the burdensome financial costs that permanent 
secretariats necessitate. Yet, the agreement seems to envisage the possibility to have only 
administrative and no legal support from an external body. This could be a signal that parties, 
themselves, preferred a system that would indirectly allow ‘greater interpretative divergence’.85 It 
is unpredictable yet, whether EUJEPA parties would make use of an external body for 
administrative assistance at all, whether this will happen on a regular basis or whether the same 
external body would be used in all the instances. The parties could make use of the WTO 
Secretariat itself, though in this case at least consensus among all WTO Members would be 
required and this is highly improbable to happen given the difficulty to arrive at a consensus, or 
other bodies could be used, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) or the International 
Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce .86 Using the support of already 
established courts could be beneficial, as it would mean also using the established authority of 
these bodies.87 How the provision contained in EUJEPA on external assistance would be used (if 
ever used) in practice remains to be seen.  
To conclude, CETA and EUJEPA DSMs do not provide with internal or external bodies to 
offer legal support to the panels. Still, this might not affect their emergence as attractive 
alternatives to the WTO DSM, as parties might even consider this an advantage. Moreover, in 
contrast to CETA, EUJEPA provides the possibility to have administrative support. Thus, this 
DSM model could be perceived as a balanced way of ensuring that panels benefit from 
administrative support, while not empowering another body with too much interpretative power. 
 
84 EUJEPA, Art. 21.25(2) 
85 Geraldo Vidigal, ‘Making Regional Dispute Settlement Attractive: The “Court of Arbitration” Option’ (RTA 
Exchange, ICTSD 2018) <www.ictsd.org/opinion/making-regional-dispute-settlement-attractive-the-> accessed 24 
July 2019 
86 Ibid 
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4.6 Transparency and Openness of the Proceedings 
The level of transparency in CETA, EUJEPA and WTO proceedings is another difference 
between them. Transparency is gaining more and more attention, given the civil society’s increased 
interest in and scrutiny of international trade policy.  
The level of transparency in WTO varies depending on different stages of the proceedings. 
Consultations,88 parties’ submissions,89 as well as panel and AB hearings are closed by default.90 
The publicity of consultations could imperil the amicable resolution of the disputes,91 therefore 
their confidentiality is not raising concerns. The confidentiality of submissions was, however, 
criticized especially by those who would have liked to submit amici curiae briefs, but had no 
access to submissions in order to know how to supplement the advanced arguments.92 The closed 
hearings at both panel and AB levels have been the subject of active debates. The issue proved to 
be controversial among Member States.93 In the end WTO panels and AB relied on Art. 18.2 of 
the DSU according to which parties have the right to disclose to the public their statements, to 
reach the conclusion that subject to the agreement of the parties, hearings can be public.94 Even 
though there were several cases in which parties opted for public hearings, the general rule is still 
that hearings take place behind closed doors. Moreover, even when the hearings are open, they 
‘are broadcast, sometimes even days after the actual hearing takes place, in a room at the WTO 
headquarters’.95 
As well as under WTO rules, consultations shall be confidential under CETA and EUJEPA.96 
Submissions, on the other hand, are to be made public.97 Moreover, the general rule is that hearings 
are public, unless parties agree otherwise or the submissions contain confidential information.98 
 
88 DSU, Art. 4.6 
89 DSU, Art. 18.2; Unless Members decide to individually release their submissions. 
90 WTO, AB, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/6, 16 August 2010, Appendix 3, para 2; DSU, 
Art. 17.10 
91 Gabrielle Marceau, Mikella Hurley, ‘Transparency and Public Participation in the WTO: A Report Card on WTO 
Transparency Mechanisms’ (2012) 4 (1) Trade, Law and Development p. 19, 25 
92 Ibid p. 26 
93 Lothar Ehring, ‘Public Access to Dispute Settlement Hearings in the World Trade Organization’ (2008) 11(4) 
Journal of International Economic Law p. 1021, 1022 
94 Panel Report, Canada – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute (US – Continued 
Suspension), WT/DS321/R, 31 March 2008, [7.38-7.52]; Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Suspension, 
WT/DS321/AB/R, 16 October 2008, Annex IV 
95 WTO, ‘Farewell speech of Appellate Body Member Ricardo Ramírez-Hernández’ 28 May 2018 
<www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ricardoramirezfarwellspeech_e.htm> accessed 24 July 2019 
96 CETA, Art. 29.4(6); EUJEPA, Art. 21.5(6) 
97 CETA, Annex 29-A Rules of Procedure for Arbitration, para 38; EUJEPA, Art. 21.15(3) 
98 CETA, Annex 29-A Rules of Procedure for Arbitration, para 38; EUJEPA, Art. 21.15(1)  
 18 
Therefore, CETA and EUJEPA provide with more transparency than the WTO does. Publicity of 
proceedings allows representatives of civil society to see the manner in which they take place, that 
parties are given the opportunity to represent their interest and that panelists are mindful of the 
interests at stake. This can help with building more trust and credibility in the systems, which 
subsequently also strengthens their legitimacy.99 Moreover, a complainant that brings a case on a 
political sensitive issue could seek support from the civil society. Of course, there can be cases in 
which parties might want to avoid publicity, but in such cases, they can decide by mutual 
agreement to have closed hearings.  
Closely related to the issue of transparency is the possibility of amicus briefs submissions 
during the proceedings. The question of amicus briefs submitted by non-parties to the disputes in 
WTO proceedings turned to be a contentious issue,100 especially because it raised fears that the 
AB overreached its mandate and was involved in law-making when admitted such possibility.101 
Neither the DSU, nor the Working Procedures for Appellate Review specifically address this issue. 
The AB, however, interpreted the DSU rules as entitling panels and AB to consider and, 
eventually, accept amicus briefs.102 Yet, in practice very few were considered and even fewer were 
accepted.103 On the other hand, both CETA and EUJEPA expressly allow the submission of amicus 
curiae briefs by non-governmental entities, natural or legal persons that are established in either 
party.104 It is not yet clear if in practice the panels established in CETA and EUJEPA will actually 
take into account amicus curiae brief. Nevertheless, the express regulation of the submission of 
amici is to be appreciated, since it can be considered a lesson learned from the WTO that lacks 
 
99 Ehring supra note 93 p. 1024 
100 Theresa Squatrito, ‘Amicus Curiae Briefs in the WTO DSM: Good or Bad News for Non-State Actor 
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102 Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US – 
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104 CETA, Annex 29-A Rules of Procedure for Arbitration, para 43; EUJEPA, Art. 21.17(3). However, only ‘unless 
the Parties agree otherwise’ according to the Rules of Procedure of a Panel (Decision No 1/2019 of 10 April 2019 of 
the Joint Committee of the EU-Japan EPA [2019/1035]), para. 38 
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such an express provision. Openness of the procedures would be especially appreciated by the civil 
society whose view would be known to the panels.105 
Therefore, the increased levels of transparency and openness score in favor of considering 
CETA and EUJEPA DSMs as potential alternatives to the WTO DSM, especially if parties want 
to obtain the support of the civil society for international dispute settlement. 
4.7 Implementation Stage 
4.7.1 Temporary Remedies in Case of Non-Compliance 
While the implementation stages in CETA and EUJEPA are very similar to those prescribed 
by the DSU, there are also some differences that could influence their emergence as potential 
attractive alternatives for solving trade disputes between the parties. 
CETA and EUJEPA contain additional grounds for recourse to trade remedies by the 
complainant at an earlier stage which provide more flexibility for the complainant. Under CETA 
rules in case the respondent initially fails to notify its intention to comply within twenty days after 
the receipt of the final panel report, even without establishing a RPT, the complainant can have 
recourse to temporary remedies.106 Under EUJEPA rules, if the respondent notifies that it is 
impracticable to comply within the RPT, without waiting for its expiry the complainant can make 
use of trade remedies.107 Therefore, the rules of CETA and EUJEPA could be perceived more 
advantageous from the perspective of the complainant that can pressure the respondent into 
compliance sooner. 
CETA and EUJEPA offer the same temporary remedies to induce compliance as the DSU.108   
Compensation is a remedy that in practice under the DSU has been rarely used.109 It is generally 
understood to refer only to trade concessions and benefits and not monetary payments.110 
Introducing monetary compensations as alternative remedies has been advocated by some 
 
105 Astrid Wiik, Amicus Curiae before International Courts and Tribunals (4 vol Successful Dispute Resolution, 
Nomos, Hart Publishing 2018) 
106 CETA, Art. 29.14(1)(a) 
107 EUJEPA, Art. 15.15(1) 
108 CETA, Art. 29.14(1); EUJEPA, Art. 21.22(2). 
109 Bryan Mercurio, ‘Why Compensation Cannot Replace Trade Retaliation in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding’ (2009) 8(2) World Trade Review p. 315, 324. 
110 Ibid p. 328. 
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scholars111 and Members.112 EUJEPA seems to allow the use of monetary payments, as it offers 
another additional remedy: ‘any alternative arrangement’.113  This alternative remedy is formulated 
broad enough to encompass any possible arrangement that parties agree on, including on monetary 
compensation. Therefore, under EUJEPA parties have more remedies to choose from to induce 
compliance 
If the complainant makes use of suspension of obligations, similar to the DSU, CETA and 
EUJEPA establish that it shall be at a level equivalent to the nullification or impairment caused by 
the violation.114  The level of nullification and impairment under CETA rules shall be calculated 
starting from the date of notification of the final report to the Parties.115 Thus, CETA provides with 
partial retrospective effects of retaliation, unlike the DSU under which remedies are only of a 
prospective nature.116 While under CETA the suspension of obligations does not have effects of 
reparation and is still meant to be used only to induce compliance, it may incentivise parties to 
comply more promptly and deter foot dragging in compliance with the final ruling. CETA and 
EUJEPA also contain qualitative requirements for the suspension of obligations. However, unlike 
the DSU, they provide that the suspension of obligations shall be applied to any sector that is 
covered by the dispute settlement chapters.117 Therefore, the qualitative requirements are flexible 
and do not require that retaliation be first applied in the same sector as in which the violation was 
found. This allows parties to always suspend obligations from a sector that they might think could 
pressure more the respondent to comply.    
Based on the analysis performed in this section it can be concluded that the system of the trade 
remedies found in CETA and EUJEPA could help induce compliance more effectively than the 
trade remedies available at the WTO level. Therefore, from this perspective CETA and EUJEPA 
DSMs could be perceived as attractive alternatives for the WTO DSM.  
4.7.2 ‘Sequencing’ and Compliance Post Retaliation Issues 
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The implementation procedures under the DSU are facing two issues: sequencing and 
compliance post retaliation. The DSB has to grant authorization for retaliation within thirty days 
of the expiry of the RPT, while the compliance procedures should take ninety days.118 These 
timeframes would require the DSB to authorize retaliation before the failure to implement 
compliance measures would have been decided. In practice states started to sign ad-hoc voluntary 
agreements to establish that compliance procedures are to take place first.119 These voluntary 
agreements, however, do not remedy the contradictive text of the DSU. CETA and EUJEPA do 
not provide with any conflicting timeframes. Moreover, one of the reasons for imposing remedies 
in these agreements is the presence of the panel ruling issued in compliance proceedings.120 
Therefore, compliance proceedings clearly shall take place always before applying temporary 
compliance remedies. 
Another issue at the implementation stage in WTO proceedings, is that the DSU does not 
provide any procedure for reviewing the measures taken by the respondent after remedies were 
imposed, in case parties cannot reach an agreement on the compliance of those measures.121 
Dealing with this issue in practice, the AB established that even though the DSU does not establish 
procedures to be followed in case of disagreement over compliance after retaliation, this does not 
mean that members need to stay passive, but they need to use the existent compliance measures 
that are mentioned in the DSU for the purpose to establish compliance before retaliation.122 While 
the DSU does not expressly deal with the matter of compliance review post-retaliation, both CETA 
and EUJEPA specifically regulate this situation. They provide that in case the parties do not reach 
an agreement on the consistency of the measures taken to comply with the final report after 
remedies were imposed, a panel shall rule on this matter.123  
Therefore, CETA and EUJEPA DSMs are better drafted than the WTO DSM, as they avoid 
the sequencing problem and are more developed with respect to the compliance proceeding during 
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post-retaliation phase. Parties could see this as an advantage when considering whether to use 
them as alternative fora for trade dispute settlement. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigated whether CETA and EUJEPA DSMs could emerge as attractive 
alternative fora for solving trade disputes. It first introduced WTO, CETA and EU Japan DSMs 
to the reader, by briefly describing them and their similarities.  
It then proceeded to analyze the substantive coverage of CETA and EUJEPA DSMs and how 
it shapes them as possible alternatives. It concluded that from a substantive perspective, CETA 
and EUJEPA DSMs could become alternatives to the WTO DSM with respect to many trade 
related issues, but not all of them. Moreover, in some instances the substantive considerations 
could score in favor of the use of CETA and EUJEPA DSMs as alternatives or could make them 
not mere alternatives, but the only options for enforcement.  
With respect to areas in which FTA DSMs could become alternatives, the procedural aspects 
would also play a major role. From a procedural perspective, the paper argued that CETA and 
EUJEPA DSMs could be alternatives only for bilateral dispute settlement. The panel composition 
processes under these agreements are designed in a way to ensure that they cannot be blocked by 
one party, however proceedings under CETA raise concerns with respect to arbitrators’ 
independence and could be prone to delays in case the lists of arbitrators are not established. CETA 
and EUJEPA DSMs could be especially attractive for states looking for speedier proceedings and 
more control over the dispute settlement. There are indications that parties could want more 
control over the dispute settlement. EUJEPA DSM, notably, strikes a balance between benefitting 
from administrative support and not delegating too much authority to an external body. CETA and 
EUJEPA DSMs could also receive the support of the civil society, because of their increased levels 
of transparency. Furthermore, the available temporary remedies at the implementation stage could 
serve as strong tools to induce compliance. Lastly, CETA and EUJEPA have more developed 
rules on implementation than the WTO DSM when it comes to the sequencing issue and 
compliance post-retaliation, which scores in favor of perceiving them as possible alternatives. 
To conclude, the substantive considerations, expeditiousness, more control given to the parties, 
increased transparency, as well as, stronger and more developed compliance rules could make the 
DSMs contained in EUJEPA and CETA (provided that the list of arbitrators are established) 
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attractive alternative fora for solving trade disputes between FTA parties concerning areas covered 
by the dispute settlement chapters. Nevertheless, these DSMs cannot be full alternatives, as they 
have no multilateral character and do not have the same scope of coverage as the WTO DSM. 
Moreover, if FTA parties would be more inclined towards DSMs that offer more coherence, 
predictability and, potentially, better quality reports, CETA and EUJEPA DSMs could be less 
attractive alternatives. 
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